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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2866 
___________ 
 
JIMI ROSE, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE MORNING CALL NEWSPAPER; MARANATHA BROADCASTING 
COMPANY, INC., doing business as WFMZ-TV; JULISA BONILLA, PROTESTOR 
AND AGENT PROVOCATEUR; THE CHICAGO TRIBUNE;  
BASILIO A. BONILLA, JR., PROTESTOR AND UNKNOWN AGENT’S 
PROVOCATEUR, BETHLEHEM SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 5:15-cv-02002) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2017 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 15, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Jimi Rose filed this suit in April 2015, and was granted permission to proceed in 
forma pauperis.  Rose’s initial pleading was part memoir, part vigorous diatribe.  And it 
was of such great length and ambiguity that it inspired sua sponte dismissal by the 
District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and without prejudice.  The 
District Court allowed Rose thirty days to file an amended complaint, one in which Rose 
was to state “as clearly and briefly as possible” the nature of his claims, the facts relevant 
to those claims, the harm he suffered, and the remedies he sought.  
 The District Court thrice granted Rose additional time to produce an amended 
complaint, which he eventually filed in October 2015.  The District Court dismissed the 
amended complaint for failure to state a claim, under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), concluding that 
the “[t]he amended complaint largely mirrors the original complaint—and suffers from 
the same deficiencies.”  The dismissal was with prejudice.  Rose’s subsequent motion for 
reconsideration was granted by the District Court, which reopened the case and allowed 
Rose to file a second amended complaint.   
 After receiving an extension of time, Rose filed a second amended complaint.  The 
District Court again dismissed Rose’s case under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  The District Court 
concluded that Rose’s newest pleading was “a rambling recitation of the events that 
occurred in his life since the early 1990’s, and does not give rise to any clear basis for a 
claim against any of the defendants.”  The District Court dismissed Rose’s action with 
prejudice, and this appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our standard of review is de novo.  
See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We have carefully considered 
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Rose’s arguments on appeal—in particular that his second amended complaint did in fact 
state a viable claim—and find them to be unpersuasive.  We also note that the District 
Court gave Rose multiple opportunities to clarify his allegations and claims in accordance 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Rose, an experienced pro se litigant, failed to 
take advantage of those opportunities.  Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court.1  
                                              
1 We observe Rose’s seemingly central allegations in his operative pleading that 
numerous unknown “protestors” collaborated with Basilio and Julisa Bonilla to sign a 
petition urging the closure of Rose’s business—a cabaret called Scoobie’s Gentlemen’s 
Club (which ultimately closed not because of the petition, but, apparently, because of a 
catastrophic fire)—and that those actors allegedly conspired with a local newspaper (The 
Morning Call) and a local television station (WFMZ-TV) to falsely report to the general 
public that Rose’s business “was a nuisance bar.”  Rose claimed that the foregoing 
petition-signing and critique-publicizing was unconstitutional.  However, we discern no 
viable federal claim amidst Rose’s allegations.  See, e.g., Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due 
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its 
citizens against invasion by private actors.”).  With the most liberal of readings Rose’s 
complaint might be said to have stated a defamation claim under state law against fellow 
Pennsylvania citizens, a claim over which the District Court could not have exercised 
jurisdiction.  Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).         
 
